Insurgent violence has crippled local agriculture and trade in the Irumu territory, leaving rural populations facing potential famine and financial ruin. In the Lubero region, the group’s expansion is attributed to geographical barriers, security vacuums, and insufficient military logistics, further complicated by the presence of undisciplined local militias. Ultimately, the sources highlight a desperate need for better coordination and intelligence to dismantle a terror network that has successfully integrated into local socio-economic structures.
Factors contribute to the current situation:
Economic Asphyxiation in Irumu
In the southern part of the Irumu territory, particularly in Bandavilemba, the economic engine, agriculture is virtually at a standstill.
- Agricultural Collapse: Fear of attacks has forced many farmers to abandon their lands. Even when harvests like beans are successful, farmers struggle to find buyers due to the prevailing climate of terror.
- Commercial Paralysis: Recent attacks, such as the one in Butani village involving the burning of motorcycles and violence against civilians, have discouraged investment. Shops and kiosks operate at a minimum, and economic operators are hesitant to inject capital for fear of looting.
Strategic Entrenchment in Lubero
In the Lubero territory, specifically the Bapere and Baswagha sectors, ISCAP has successfully entrenched since June 2024.
- Geographical Advantages: The Bapere sector, which accounts for 51% of Lubero’s land area, is the second-largest forest massif in North Kivu. This dense, isolated terrain, filled with small footpaths and rivers without bridges, is ideal for guerrilla warfare.
- Logistical Failures: The lack of infrastructure prevents the FARDC from deploying heavy logistics. Soldiers often carry their own rations and munitions on foot, limiting their operational window to only about four days before needing to resupply, which allows ISCAP to reorganize.
- Security Vacuum and Militias: The group’s entry was facilitated by a lack of military presence, leaving the area in the hands of various Wazalendo CPU (Community Defense Groups). These local militias are often described as undisciplined or too weak to resist ISCAP, sometimes fleeing and leaving civilians vulnerable.
Socio-Economic Integration and Intelligence Gaps
ISCAP has evolved by integrating into local structures to ensure its survival:
- “Buffer Zones”: In mining areas like Isange and Budhudia, the group has established zones where they cohabit with civilians and impose a “cacao tax” on gold miners and traders to fund their operations.
- Intelligence Failures: The intelligence services (ANR) in these remote areas are severely underfunded, often lacking even basic communication credits to verify alerts.
- Local Recruitment: The group exploits the local population’s lack of understanding of their “jihadist” nature, recruiting local collaborators to act as spies or logistics providers.
Despite the efforts of the government entities calling for a three days strategic meeting in Beni (March 2026) aimed to create a “synergy” between the FARDC, UPDF, and MONUSCO to move beyond defensive stances and finally dismantle this network, ISCAP maintain entrenched amount the local community commanding and controlling the security narrative.
The security environment within SADC region during the six-month period from
September 2025 to February 10, 2026, has reached a critical maturation point defined
by the tactical resilience and financial diversification of Islamic State affiliates. The
reporting period underscores a significant shift where localized insurgencies have
transformed into a networked, multi-polar threat managed through the Islamic State’s
General Directorate of Provinces (GDP). This evolution is most visible in the Republic
of Mozambique and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), where the Islamic
State Mozambique (IS-M) and the Islamic State Central Africa Province (ISCAP) have
established “parallel state” structures that challenge national sovereignty and regional
stability.
It covers Mozambique’s Islamic State’s (IS-M) terror activity, from December 2025 to 28 February 2026, provides an overview based on OSINT and HUMINT, aimed at assessing evolving terrorism threats and counterterrorism operations across the Southern African Development Community region through concise and comprehensive analysis.
MOZAMBIQUE
Six (06) military personnel from Mozambican (FADM) and Rwandan forces were killed in a claimed firearm ambush by the IS-M along road N380, near the village of Quinto Congreso in Macómia, on 26 February 2026.
Two (02) civilians from CPU–Namparamas were captured and killed during a claimed firearm attack by the IS-M along the N380 road toward Quinto Congreso in Macomia, on 26 February 2026.
One (01) FADM soldier and one (01) civilian were killed, several military and medical equipment were captured, and two vehicles were damaged during a claimed firearm ambush by the IS-M near the village of Quinto Congreso in Macómia, on 24 February 2026.
Fourteen (14) DFS (FADM & RDF) personnel were killed, and several military equipment were captured during a claimed firearm attack by the IS-M, in Macomia on 24 February2026.
One (01) FADM soldier killed and several equipment were captured during a double claimed firearm attack by the IS-M on a military camp in Katupa forest, Macómia, on 15 February 2026.
Six (06) FADM soldiers were killed and several military equipment were captured during claimed firearm clashes in Katupa forest, Macómia, on 9 February 2026.
One (01) FADM soldier was killed and five (05) rifles were captured during a claimed firearm attack by the IS-M on the village of Namabo in Macómia district, on 8 February, 2026.
Nine (09) FADM soldiers were killed, a military camp and barracks were burned, and a large amount of military equipment was captured during a claimed firearm attack by the IS-M on 3 February, 2026.
An FADM naval vessel was damaged during a mortar ambush targeting a military naval patrol near Sona Island in Mocímboa da Praia, on 27 January, 2026.
One (01) FADM soldier was captured and beheaded during a claimed bladed weapon attack by the IS-M against a military camp near the village of Chai in Macómia district, on 10 January, 2026.
Several RDF personnel were killed, military equipment was captured during a claimed firearm attack by the IS-M in Mukoju, Macómia, on 27 December 2025.
Five (05) RDF personnel were killed during a claimed firearm attack by the IS-M in Macómia on 26 December 2025.
Two (02) RDF naval patrol personnel were wounded during a claimed mortar ambush by the IS-M near Nabag Island in Mocímboa da Praia, on 26 December 2025.
Four (04) FADM soldiers were wounded during a claimed firearm attack by the IS-M against a military patrol near the village of Kiterajo in Macomia, on 24 December 2025.
One (01) civilian was kidnapped and beheaded during a claimed bladed weapon attack by the IS-M near the village of Magaya in Muidumbe, on 22 December 2025.
Two (02) CPU members were captured and beheaded during a double claimed bladed weapon attack by the IS-M against civilian vigilantes near the village of Nambido in Nangade, on 12 December 2025.
Two (02) Military personnel were killed, four (04) wounded, and several military equipment were captured from Mozambican and Rwandan forces during a double claimed IED attack by the IS-M against a military road patrol near the village of Xitashi in Muidumbe district, on 7 December 2025.
Eight (08) military (FADM & RDF) personnel forces were wounded, one vehicle and several military equipment were captured during a claimed IED ambush by the IS-M on the road between the villages of Chitunda and Xitashi, on 6 December 2025.