| EARLY WARNING ANALYSIS | ITURI PROVINCE, DRC | 29 JUNE 2026 |
Silent Zones, Dangerous Borders:
How the Communications Gap in Mambasa Territory Undermines Early Warning Against ISCAP
| TERRITORY
Mambasa, Ituri |
THREAT ACTOR
ISCAP (IS-CAP) |
SURFACE AREA
~36,000 km² |
ANALYST
Abel Fernandes |
On 25 June 2026, the traditional leaders of the seven[1] chiefdoms of Mambasa Territory, Ituri Province, convened to submit a formal petition to provincial authorities and telecommunications operators for expanded mobile network coverage. The rationale is that, the absence of reliable communications infrastructure is systematically degrading civilian early warning capacity against incursions by the Islamic State for Central Africa Province (ISCAP).
EWRAC analyses the strategic implications of that gap and its consequences for early warning architecture across one of the region’s most persistently contested territories.
Background: ISCAP in the Mambasa Corridor
Mambasa Territory, located approximately 174 kilometres west of Bunia, has been a persistent zone of ISCAP activity. The group operates under the broader Islamic State Central Africa Province banner and has sustained a pattern of targeted attacks against villages, civilians, and infrastructure across eastern DRC, exploiting both the limited presence of FARDC forces and the porous cross-border terrain with Uganda and South Sudan.
Mambasa’s geography compounds the challenge. Spanning nearly 36,000 km², the territory encompasses dense forest corridors, border zones with Haut-Uele’s Watsa Territory, and remote chiefdoms that have remained largely outside the reach of state security presence. It is precisely in these areas that ISCAP has demonstrated the greatest operational freedom of movement.
The Early Warning Failure: A Structural Analysis
The communications gap as a tactical asset for ISCAP
The absence of mobile coverage across large swathes of Mambasa is not merely a humanitarian deficit. It constitutes a security vulnerability that ISCAP is actively exploiting. Dead zones along the Walesse-Bese chiefdom, which borders Watsa Territory, provide ISCAP with effective operational cover: incursions can occur, develop, and conclude before the first alert reaches FARDC.
The incident in Bahaha village[2], in the Babila-Bakwanza chiefdom, provides a concrete illustration of the failure chain. Following an ISCAP attack, survivors were compelled to travel nearly 15 kilometers on foot before locating a network signal sufficient to alert security forces. By the time the alert was transmitted, the tactical window for an effective intercept response had passed. That the military was already present on the scene and managed to limit casualties represents a fortunate exception, not a reliable model.
“There is no network in the entire chiefdom. I had installed Wi-Fi[3], but ISCAP came and stole it. Yet, it was our only means of communication.”
— Chief Faustin Sukari, Walesse-Bese Chiefdom
Walesse-Bese: the most acute gap
The chiefdom of Walesse-Bese represents the most analytically significant coverage vacuum in Mambasa. All 21 villages have no mobile phone network. Situated on the border with Watsa Territory in Haut-Uele, this zone functions as an unmonitored infiltration corridor for ISCAP. The deliberate destruction of the sole alternative communication asset, the chief’s Wi-Fi installation by ISCAP operatives suggests targeted denial of communication nodes, not incidental damage. From an early warning standpoint, a chiefdom with zero reporting capacity on an active militant border is not merely an intelligence gap. It is a blind spot that adversaries are operationally trained to exploit.
Key Analytical Findings
| 1 | ISCAP is deliberately targeting communication infrastructure.
The theft of the Wi–Fi system in Walesse-Bese reflects an operational awareness that civilian communication capacity enables the early warning networks that complicate ISCAP freedom of movement. Eliminating that capacity extends the operational window available after an incursion. |
| 2 | A security-communications feedback loop is entrenching the gap.
Telecommunications operators cite insecurity as the reason they cannot deploy technical teams. But insecurity is itself worsened by absent communications. Without deliberate external intervention public-private coordination, security escorts for deployment teams, or satellite-based alternatives this loop is self-perpetuating. |
| 3 | Traditional authority networks are the first-tier early warning layer and they are unconnected.
Traditional chiefs and community leaders represent the most granular, timely, and contextually embedded intelligence network in Mambasa. Their capacity to function as early warning nodes is entirely contingent on having a transmission channel. At present, that channel requires a 15-kilometre foot journey. |
| 4 | The Walesse-Bese/Watsa border corridor is a priority security concern.
Twenty-one villages, zero coverage, on an ISCAP-active border. This is a border security and corridor interdiction failure with direct implications for ISCAP freedom of movement along main routs and into the broader Southern and Central Africa Region. |
Early Warning Implications
| Dimension | Current status | EW impact |
| Alert speed | 15+ km travel to signal | High degradation – tactical window lost |
| Coverage geography | Entire chiefdoms uncovered | Blind spots in ISCAP operating zones |
| Civilian reporter network | Present but unconnected | First-tier EW layer non-functional |
| FARDC response trigger | Ad hoc / pre-positioned | No reliable dispatch mechanism |
| Operator deployment | Blocked by insecurity | No short-term commercial solution |
Recommendations for EWRAC and SADC Consideration
Immediate priorities
- Explore satellite-based alternatives such as Konnect Africa operates satellite-backhauled, VSAT or equivalent solutions for Walesse–Bese and Babila–Bakwanza as an emergency communications bridge, prioritizing the Watsa border zone.
- Establish a formal community alert protocol between traditional chiefs and FARDC/PNC units, with designated relay points and HF radio devices where satellite is unavailable.
Short to medium term
- Public-private working group involving mobile operators, provincial authorities, and Defense and Security Forces to develop a phased coverage expansion plan with security guarantees.
| About EWRAC
The Early Warning Research and Analysis Centre (EWRAC) provides strategic intelligence, early warning analysis, and counterterrorism advisory services to support decision-makers across AU, SADC, and UN frameworks. Areas of focus include organized crime and terrorism convergence, illicit mineral economies, corridor and routs security, and counter-violent extremism – with particular expertise in the Southern Africa region including Lobito Corridor. https://ewrac.org/ |
[1] Babila-Babombi, Babila-Bakwanza, Bandaka, Bombo-Bagumba, Mambasa, Walese-Dese and Walese-Karo
[2] On 29-30 March 2026 killing 20 civilians and abducting over 400 people, the majority of them farmers
[3] Konnect Africa operates satellite-backhauled Wi-Fi hotspots